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IN THE SUPREME rCOURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN HOLDING COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
PARKER G HANSON and GARDA P. ) 
HANSON, his \Vife, 
Defendants and Respondents. , 
Case No. 
11743 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Appellant against Respond-
ents to have declared terminated, because of certain 
breaches of lea,se, a certain Agreement to Lease entered 
into by and between Appellant'is assignor and Respondents. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Upon Motions for Summary Judgment filed by both the 
Appellant and Respondents herein, the District Court of the 
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Fifth Judicial District in and for the County of Washington, 
State of Utah, found that there were no genuine and mate-
rial issues of fact involved in the matter and found as a 
matter of law that Respondents were entitled to judgment 
of no cause of action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the ruling of the lower court 
granting Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
seeks judgment of this court granting Appellant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 10, 1961 B. & E. Securities, Inc., a Utah Cor-
poration, as Lessor, entered into a certain Agreement to 
Lease with Respondents as Lessee, wherein Respondents 
did lease from said Lessor certain property located in Lot 
5, Block 15, Plat A, St George City Survey as more par-
ticularly described in said Agreement to Lease. (Exhibit 
P-1) Subsequent to the execution of the Agreement to 
Lease, the original Lessor did assign all its right in said 
Agreement to Appellant and also conveyed its interest in 
the leased property to the Appellant. (R-2) Among other 
provisions, the Agreement to Lease in question contained 
the following statements: 
A. "In the event that Hansons fail, neglect or refuse 
to pay the rentals as above set forth. the Company 
may terminate this Lease by proper notice of said 
breach ... " (Exhibit P-1, Page 2) 
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B. "To pay all utility bil1s levied and assessedd against 
said building or the occupants thereof, in the 
amounts so assessed and before delinquency." (Ex-
hibit P-1, Page 2) 
C. "To pay all taxes that may be levied and assessed 
against the personal property belonging to Hansons 
that may be in said building, in the amounts so 
assessed and before delinquency." (Exhibit P-1, 
Page 2) 
Subsequent to the execution of the said Agreement to 
Lease, the Respondents took possession of the leased prem-
ises and have held possession, use, and control of the same 
up to the present time. The Respondents made their month-
ly rental payments as called for by the Agreement to Lease 
until March of 1965 when they became delinquent. (R. 35) 
& 36). The delinquency continued up to September of 1966. 
(R. 35 & 36) 
On September 9, 1966 the Appellant, acting through its 
attorney, caused to be mailed by U. S. Mail, Certified-Re-
turn Requested, letters advising the Respondents that they 
were delinquent in their payments. (R. 56, 57, 58 & 59). 
On October 4, 1966 an additional notice was mailed to the 
Respondents advising them that they were delinquent in 
their rental payments for the month of September, 1966. 
( R. 60 & 61) Thereafter, the Respondents made periodic 
payments on the lease rentals, but were continually de-
linquent up to and including the month of April, 1968 when 
a payment of $178.56 was made to Appellant, which pay-
ment was the rental for the months of December, 1967 and 
/ 
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January and February, 1968. (R. 35 & 36) No further 
rental payments were made or tendered to Appellant until 
December 4, 1968 when Respondents apparently mailed to 
Appellant a check, the exact amount of which is unknown 
to Appellant. claiming the check to be for back rental. (De-
position of Parker G. Hanson, Page 6) Appellant did not 
accept the letter and it was returned by the Post Office to 
Respondents. {Deposition of Parker G. Hanson, Page 6) On 
December 12, 1968 the Appellant caused to be served upon 
the Respondents a Notice of Termination of the Agreement 
to Lease and requested in the Notice that Respondents de-
liver the possession of the leased premises to Appellant. 
(Exhibit P-2) The Notice of Termination was based upon 
the rental payment delinquencies and upon delinquencies in 
the payment of personal property taxes and utility bills. 
(Exhibit P-2) Respondents were delinquent in the payment 
of personal property taxes on the leased premises and in the 
payment of utility bills on said premises from approximately 
the year 1965 to the date Appellant's notice was served upon 
them. (R. 37, 38, 47 to 55) In regards to the delinquent 
general property taxes, the Respondents had not conformed 
to the requirements of Title 59, Chapter 4, Section 10, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. (R. 38) 
Subsequent to the serving of the Notice to Quit and of 
Termination upon Respondents as above set forth, and upon 
their refusal to deliver possession of the leased premises, 
the Appellant brought this action to have the Agreement 
to Lease above mentioned declared terminated and for an 
order delivering the possession of the premises to Appellant 
and for attorney fees and costs (R. 1 to 6) 
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POLNT ON APPEAL 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING AND 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND GRANTLNG THE MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT FILED BY RESPONDENTS. 
ARGUMENT 
Both parties hereto, by filing Motions for Summary 
Judgment, in effect, admit that there are no material issues 
of fact to be decided by the court. The fact that the delin-
quencies of Respondents in carrying out the parties' Agree-
ment to Lease occurred are uncontroverted and are fully 
set forth in the record. The only issue involved is whether 
or not such delinquencies or breaches in the Agreement to 
Lease were sufficient as a matter of law, to enable the Ap-
pellant to declare the Lease Agreement terminated. 
"If it be stipulated in the Lease or Agreement under 
which a tenant holds the demised premises that if he 
be guilty of a breach of a particular covenant or stip-
ulation, or generally, of any of the covenants in the 
Lease, or stipulation in the Agreement, on his part to be 
performed or observed, the landlord may re-enter and 
the tenant be guilty of any such breach the landlord 
may accordingly re-enter or bring ejectment". 1 Mc-
Adam on Landlord and tenant 815." 
"A clause in a Lease which provides for its termination 
at the election of the lessor, upon default in payment 
of rent, although in the form of a stipulation. i.s still a 
condition, since it provides for ending the term and 
6 
forfeiture of the estate in case of default." I McAdam 
on Landlord and tenant 821. 
For other authority dealing with the validity of a pro-
vision for forfeiture in a Lease upon non-payment of rent, 
see 51 CJS Pages 332 and 350. 
The law in Utah seems to be that ordinarily unless a 
Lease specifically so provides, failure to pay the rent does 
not automatically terminate it and there must be a proper 
demand for its payment King v. Firm, 3 Ut. 2d 419, 285 P. 
2d 1114 {1955). On the other hand, any demand for the 
payment of rent may be waived by an express provision in 
the Agreement to Lease. King v. Firm, 3 Ut. 2nd 419, 285 
P. 2d 1114, 1118; {1955); Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments, 
14 Utah 2d, 250, 252, 381 P. 2d 735 (1963). 
In this particular case, the Agreement to Lease provided, 
in effect, that in the event the Respondents failed to pay 
the rental as required therein, the Appellant could term-
inate the Lease by notice. (Exhibit P-1, Page 2, Paragraph 
6). It ts contended by Appellant therefore, that the provision 
of the Agreement to Lease providing for such termination 
places this case in the same situation as the King and Shoe-
maker cases mentioned above and the Appellant herein 
could terminate the Lease by giving notice without any 
demand that the rental delinquency be paid prior to such 
termination. The record in this case is clear that there was 
a delinquency in the rental payments from February of 1968 
to December of 1968, a period of ten months. In December 
of that year the Appellant elected to declare a breach of 
the Agreement to Lease and served notice upon the Re-
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spondents of such election. Under our law, as set forth in 
the King and Shoemaker cases, the Agreement to Lease 
between the parties hereto became terminated upon the 
giving of notice to the Respondents. 
It is anticipated that Respondents, in their arguments to 
this court, will make some issue over the fact that they ten-
dered by mail to Appellant any delinquent rental payment 
due on December 4, 1968 and that the notice to them of the 
termination of the Lease was not served upon them until 
December 12, 1968. In this regard, the court's attention is 
called to 51 CJS 352 wherein the following statement is 
contained: 
"It has been held that a landlord may rightfully refuse 
to accept payment of past due rent since to accept the 
belated payment would constitute a waiver." 
Resopndens, in their arguments to the trial court at the 
hearing of the parties' Motions for Summary Judgment, 
made considerable issue over the fact that the provisions of 
Utah'is Forcible Entry and Detainer statutes contained in 
Title 78, Chapter 36, Utah Code Annotated. 1953 were not 
followed by Appellant and therefore Appellant cannot claim 
a termination of the parties' Agreement to Lease. It is an-
ticipated that such a defense will be presented to this court. 
The Utah Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute was in 
part at least copied from the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, Section 1159. Buchanan v. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 
150 P. 2d 100, 154 ALR 167 (1944). In the California ca,se 
of Gilbert v Peck (Calif). 162 C 54, 121 P. 315 (1912) the 
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California Court said as follows: 
"The Code (Section 1159) does not undertake to make 
the forcible entry proceeding the exclusive remedy 
where facts showing a cause of action independent of 
the Code provisions are alleged ... " 
In 36A CJS 964 we find the following statement: 
"A forcible entry and detainer proceeding is not ex-
clusive but is cumulative of any other remedy that a 
party may have." 
In the case before the Court, no attempt has been made 
to remove the Respondents from the leased premLses and, 
in fact, and while the record may not show it, they are still 
in possession of the leased premises. Rather this proceeding 
is one to have declared terminated the Agreement to Lease 
between the parties and thereafter to obtain an order re-
moving them from the leased premises. None of the evi1s 
for which our forcible entry and detainer statutes were 
enacted are present in this case and there is no reason for 
Appellant to be forced to rely upon the remedies contained 
therein to the exclusion of all other remedies. It is submitted 
by Appellant therefore, that it did not forfeit its other 
remedies allowed it by law for failure to conform to the 
above-mentioned statutes. 
The courts have shown some reluctance to declare for-
feitures of Lease Agreements and in many cases have found, 
upon principa1s of equity, that breaches have been waived. 
In such cases, however, the party claimed the operation of 
equity must come into court with "clean hands." 
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In this case, the record shows a long series of defaults 
rnd delinquencies on the part of the Respondents. It also 
show,s wherein the Respondents were given adequate notice 
that the Appellant would not allow the delinquencies to 
continue. After the receipt of such notice, the Respondents 
still allowed their rental payments to go delinquent for a 
puiod of 10 months as well as being continually late in 
making what rental payments they did make. Certainly a 
lessor cannot be expected to continue to allow such activi-
ties to continue indefinitely nor should the courts sanction 
such actions. 
It is ,sulnnitted by Appellant that the record before the 
court shows more than sufficient delinquency to allow Ap-
pellant to declare a breach of the parties' Agreement to 
Lease, that the Appellant did elect to make such declara-
tion and that the Agreement to Lease is now terminated 
and of no further force and effect. It i,s further submitted 
that the trial court erred in finding no cause of action on 
the part of Appellant and the decision of that court should 
be reversed and Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
granted herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The election of Appellant to terminate the parties' Agree-
ment to Lease was proper and based upon ,sufficient grounds. 
The court should reserve the trial court's decision and grant 
judgment in favor of Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHILLIP L. FOREMASTER 
75 North 100 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
